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Abstract
Although interpersonal trust is essential for socioeconomic development, the formation
mechanism of trust is not well understood. Using dyadic data from an experiment and a
household survey in rural Bangladesh, this study evaluates whether the incentive for risk
sharing increases trust between villagers. Incentive for risk sharing in the dyad is
characterized by their negative income correlation, large difference in their risk preferences,
and large difference in their income volatilities. The empirical results demonstrate supporting
evidence for this hypothesis: incentive for risk sharing, particularly negative income
correlation, facilitates trust. These findings suggest that the introduction of safety net
programs such as health insurance, which reduce the incentive for risk sharing, may break
down trust. This implication could make an important contribution to our understanding of
the effect of industrialization on social capital—an effect that has long been discussed.
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31. Introduction
Interpersonal trust is an essential element of socioeconomic development, particularly in
developing countries. In rural communities, members often engage in cooperative behaviour
such as irrigation maintenance and credit transactions without a contract enforcement
institution (Bardhan, 2000; Bouma et al., 2008; Hayami, 2009; Karlan, et al. 2009; Sawada et
al. 2013). Therefore, trust between community members—namely particularized
trust—plays an important role. Trust of strangers (i.e., generalized trust) also encourages
cooperation in one-shot situations (Fukuyama, 1995; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994).
Therefore, it is important for policymakers and researchers to better understand the formation
mechanisms of particularized and generalized trust.
Previous studies have suggested that the two types of trust accumulate through
different processes: particularized trust is formed through repeated interactions between
community members (Banfield, 1958; Shapiro et al., 1992), while generalized trust is
determined by one’s personal predisposition (Platteau, 1994a, 1994b; Uslaner, 2002;
Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). While various determinants of generalized trust have been
discussed in the literature,1 the formation mechanism of particularized trust is less well
understood. Some studies have found that particularized trust increases with the proximity
between individuals, such as that characterized by ethnicity (Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004),
neighbourhood (Etang, et al. 2011), and friendship (Binzel and Fehr, 2013), and when low
communication costs are involved (Fisman and Khanna 1999). Although these findings are
insightful, they do not explain the mechanism of particularized trust formation. This study
attempts to address this issue.
One likely explanation for the formation of particularized trust is grounded in the
1 Generalized trust has been found to be related to the income level of the community and its
inequality, political characteristics, and degree of industrialization (Berggren and Jordhal,
2006; Bjornskov, 2006; Miguel et al., 2006).
4experience of cooperation. Experiencing cooperation with an individual can facilitate
particularized trust by increasing the expectation of his/her trustworthiness, the accuracy of
the expectation, and the willingness to risk the trusting behaviour (Banfield, 1958; Shapiro et
al., 1992). Indeed, previous studies have consistently shown that individuals who experience
collective actions with their community members exhibit higher trust (Durante, 2009;
Feigenberg, et al. 2013; Gneezy, et al. 2016; Schechter, 2007a; Shoji et al., 2012).
In a rural society, risk sharing arrangements provide valuable opportunities for
cooperation. Given the income volatility and poor access to a formal insurance market,
villagers have an incentive to help each other by lending money or providing food
(Fafchamps, 2010). However, the extent of cooperation between individuals has been found
to vary along with their incentive to share risk (Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Fafchamps, 1999;
Kimball, 1988; Kocherlakota, 1996; Ligon et al., 2002). This suggests that the incentive for
risk sharing could foster particularized trust by facilitating opportunities to cooperate.
However, there is also a counterargument to this assumption: people do not need to trust
others if their cooperation is already guaranteed by the incentive (Gambetta, 1998; Sitkin and
Roth, 1993; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). As a result, the impact of incentive on
particularized trust is theoretically ambiguous.
The goal of this study is to test whether two villagers linked by a strong incentive to
share risk actually form higher particularized trust. I used experimental and survey data of
1,920 dyads collected from 279 randomly selected households in 16 Bangladeshi villages.
The incentive for risk sharing between individuals is characterized by their negative income
correlation over eight agricultural seasons (Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Rosenzweig and Stark,
1989), as well as large differences in their risk preferences and in their income volatilities
(Chiappori & Reny, 2016; Legros & Newman, 2007; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2006). There was a
5devastating cyclone during the survey period, and the level of cyclone damage varied across
villages and even between households within the same village (Shoji & Murata 2018), which
provided opportunities to share risks. In order to elicit particularized trust, the current study
modified the experimental design of Berg et al. (1995). However, a distinguishing feature of
the study’s design is that the research was conducted under both anonymous and
non-anonymous conditions in order to elicit generalized and particularized trust, respectively.
The maximum amount of payoff from this experiment is equivalent to nine days’ income in
the study area.
Particularized trust was elicited only once after the household survey. Therefore, the
study exploited the cross-sectional variation and regressed the current particularized trust on
the incentive for risk sharing, as well as on the trustor fixed effects and the predetermined
dyadic characteristics that could be associated with the baseline particularized trust. In order
to address the potential endogeneity issue of income correlation and volatility, the study
employed negative weather shocks such as drought and flood as instruments. An underlying
assumption for the use of shock variables is that the timing of experiencing shocks is
exogenous after controlling for household fixed effects.
The estimation results are as follows. First, households share more risks in the
village with a higher incentive to do so; the cyclone-affected households can borrow more
from informal sources if their income is negatively correlated with the other villagers, and if
their risk preference and income volatility differ from those of the others. Second, the
empirical results obtained through the dyadic regression approach suggest a positive effect of
the incentive for risk sharing on particularized trust; negative income correlation in the dyad
is significantly associated with an increase in their particularized trust. This is robust to the
possibilities of various specification errors, such as weak instruments, reverse causality,
6measurement errors, omitted variable bias, and computation method of standard errors. It is
also shown that particularized trustworthiness increases with the gap in their risk preferences.
Further, these results cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity in the in-group
favouritism. More important, this bias would work against my central findings. Therefore, it
should be interpreted that the current result is a lower bound of actual causal effect.
The findings of this current study relate closely to those of Gneezy et al. (2016),
Durante (2009), and Shoji et al. (2012). Gneezy et al. (2016) conducted an anonymous trust
game in two communities: sea fishermen who work in groups and lake fishermen who work
individually. The authors found a significantly higher level of trust among the former than
among the latter, implying that the experience of group activities facilitated trust between
community members. Durante (2009) found that weather shocks experienced between the
16th and 18th centuries predicted variations in generalized trust across European countries,
presumably because the repeated experience of risk sharing over the centuries influenced
community members’ personal predisposition. Shoji et al. (2012) evaluated the causal impact
of the incentive for Sri Lankan farmers to contribute to community work—such as through
participation in community meetings and payment for religious festivals—on trust among
villagers. The current study differs from these previous ones in that it elicits the particularized
trust of each community member and examines the dyadic relationship, while the previous
studies utilized measures of trust on the entire community. This use of trust measures at the
individual level allows us to uncover the underlying mechanism of trust formation in more
detail by exploiting the variation in particularized trust on the part of one trustor across
trustees. Furthermore, Durante (2009) and Shoji et al. (2012) elicited trust by asking
subjective questions; however, other scholars have expressed serious doubts about the
validity of such self-reported information (Glaeser et al., 2000). In contrast, this study used an
experimental approach to quantify particularized trust.
7This study attempts to make three further contributions to the literature. First, it
uncovers the relationship between risk and trust in the context of developing countries. Since
such countries suffer from poor access to formal insurance and contract enforcement
institutions, both risk sharing and trust are essential to their economic development. However,
the study’s findings regarding the positive association between trust and the incentive for risk
sharing predict that the introduction of formal health insurance—which reduces the incentive
for risk sharing—could break trust down. Second, combining my findings with those of
previous studies suggests the potential of a poverty trap. It has been shown in the literature
that an increase in trust helps individuals achieve more efficient risk sharing (Carter and
Maluccio, 2003; Ligon and Schechter, 2012). On the other hand, the findings of this study
indicate that a stronger incentive for risk sharing also causes higher trust. Thus, community
members with low initial trust might experience a slower growth of trust than those with high
initial trust. Finally, the study suggests the potentially negative effect of social proximity on
trust. While some previous studies have found social proximity to have a positive effect on
trust, others have presented insignificant effects (Delavande and Zafar, 2015;
Johansson-Stenman et al., 2009). The current study’s findings might partially explain those
results: proximity leads to positive income correlation and similarity in the risk preference
and income volatility. These features reduce the incentive to share risks. These implications
could make an important contribution to our understanding of the effect of industrialization
on social capital—an effect that has long been discussed (Miguel et al., 2006; Polanyi,
1944/1957).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual
framework and establishes the testable hypotheses of this study. Section 3 describes the
dataset. Section 4 documents identification strategy and Section 5 shows estimation results.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
82. Conceptual Framework
2.1. Risk-Sharing Arrangements in Rural Economies
In developing countries, villagers’ incomes fluctuate over time due to various risks, such as
natural disasters, sickness, and unemployment. Given their poor access to formal insurance,
they share risks to smooth consumption, by lending money or providing food to those who
suffer from negative income shocks (Collins et al., 2009; Fafchamps, 2010; Fafchamps and
Lund, 2003; Jack and Suri, 2014; Udry, 1994). Such a risk-sharing arrangement, therefore,
plays the role of informal insurance, and it is a major source of cooperation in the village
economy.
Existing studies show evidence of risk sharing arrangements in rural economies
(Ogaki and Zhang, 2001; Park, 2006; Townsend, 1994). However, it has also been found that
limited commitment problems crucially restrict the efficiency of risk sharing (Albarran and
Attanasio, 2003; Charness and Genicot, 2009; Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Dubois et al.,
2008; Fafchamps, 1999; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Kimball, 1988; Kocherlakota, 1996;
Kruger and Perri, 2006; Laczó, 2014; Ligon et al., 2002). Since participation in risk-sharing
arrangements is voluntary for the villagers, they can deviate from the arrangement at any time
without incurring monetary cost; however, such villagers are excluded from future
arrangements and end up in an autarky economy. Therefore, efficient risk sharing can be
observed only when the extrinsic incentive to maintain the arrangement is sufficiently high
for all villagers.
This study exploits three dyadic characteristics to quantify the incentive for risk
sharing. First, the incentive is high between the individuals with negatively correlated
incomes, as it enables them to pool more risks (Coate & Ravallion, 1993; Rosenzweig &
Stark, 1989). Second, it also increases between those with a large gap in risk preferences
9(Chiappori & Reny, 2016; Legros & Newman, 2007; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2006); a risk-neutral
household is willing to offer a better deal for insurance than is a risk-averse household, so
those who demand the most insurance share risk with the least risk averse. Consequently, the
risk sharing network in equilibrium can be characterized by negative assortative matching
with respect to the risk preference. Finally, a large gap in the income volatilities between
individuals may also be associated with the incentive.2 Someone whose income is stable over
time can give more to a neighbour in need, and the latter can then pay him/her back more
during good times.
However, it should be noted that the explanatory power of negative assortative
matching with respect to the risk preference and income volatility depends on the sharing rule
of risk sharing arrangement; if it follows the equal sharing rule, the incentive for risk sharing
rather becomes smaller with the gaps (Attanasio et al., 2012; Jaramillo et al., 2015). Further,
this may be a plausible assumption at least between some villagers, such as close kinship
members; it is common in rural Bangladesh that relatives reside in the same village and form
a small community, bari. The bari plays the role of a risk sharing network (Park, 2006).
2.2. Definition of Trust
This study defines trust in line with Coleman (1990) and Fehr (2009): an individual trusts if
she voluntarily places resources at the disposal of another party without any legal
commitment from the latter. Trust therefore is a behaviour motivated by a trusting belief and
trusting preference (Coleman, 1990). A trusting belief indicates a subjective expectation
about a trustee’s behaviour under the situation where the trustee does not have an extrinsic
incentive to behave in a prosocial manner (Ashraf et al., 2006; Barr, 2003; Sapienza et al.,
2013). Trusting preference, on the other hand, is the willingness to take the risk of trusting
2 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the second and third hypotheses.
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behaviour. This social preference is referred to as betrayal aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser,
2004; Bohnet et al., 2008). Trusting behaviour is facilitated by three factors: (1) the expected
level of trustee’s trustworthiness, (2) the accuracy of the expected trustworthiness, and (3) the
willingness to take the risk of trusting behaviour. For those who exhibit betrayal aversion, an
improvement in the accuracy of expected trustworthiness (the reduction of information
asymmetries) has a positive effect on the trusting behaviour.
Although one could take prosocial behaviour by knowing that his or her opponent
does not have an incentive to betray him or her, such behaviour is not considered trust in the
definition used here. Therefore, the definition used here differs from Hardin’s (2002)
calculative trust, which considers trust a rational expectation.
2.3. Trust Formation Mechanism and Testable Hypotheses
Existing studies suggest that the incentive for risk sharing potentially increases the three
factors mentioned above (Banfield, 1958; Shapiro et al., 1992; Sheppard and Sherman, 1998).
In particular, Shapiro et al. (1992) claim that particularized trust is formed in three stages, and
that the incentive of cooperation is a necessary condition for the first stage. In the first stage,
the strong incentive to share risks between individuals enforces their cooperation, which
could, in turn, cause them to collude.3 Therefore, one believes that the probability for his/her
opponent to betray him/her is low, given the incentive to share risks. In other words,
calculative trust grows during this stage.
In the second stage, the frequent cooperation grounded in the incentive enhances
regular communication between individuals. This helps them accumulate knowledge about
each other’s trustworthiness and personality. This knowledge, therefore, improves the
accuracy of the trusting belief.
3 This is consistent with the argument of Murgai et al. (2002) and Genicott and Ray (2003).
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Finally, the repeated interactions help both the trustor and trustee form social
preference. On the one hand, the trustee behaves in a more trustworthy manner, increasing the
trustor’s belief about the trustee’s trustworthiness. On the other hand, the trustor becomes
more willing to take the risk of trusting behaviour as these interactions are experienced.
Therefore, these studies suggest that even cooperation as a result of a self-interested motive
could facilitate social preference toward the opponent.
Given this argument, this study tests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis:
Individual i should exhibit higher particularized trust in j when:
(a) their incomes are negatively correlated,
(b) the gap in their risk preferences is larger, and
(c) the gap in their income volatilities is larger.
It should, however, be noted that this study considers Hypothesis (a) to be particularly
important among the three, given the potential issue pertaining to the explanatory power of
negative assortative matching with respect to the risk preference and income volatility (see
Section 2.1).
It is also important that these hypotheses are theoretically ambiguous. Gambetta
(1998), Sitkin and Roth (1993), and Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) claim that people do
not need to trust others if their cooperation is guaranteed by the extrinsic incentive. If this is
the case, we should rather observe the opposite or an insignificant relationship.
3. Data Description and Experimental Design
3.1. Household Survey
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The study site is Satkhira district, located in southwest Bangladesh. This area is suitable for
examining the incentive for risk sharing and trust formation: this district was severely
affected by Cyclone Aila in May 2009. It caused significant economic loss, destroying around
250,000 acres of cropland and killing 150,000 livestock. The level of cyclone damage varied
across villages and even between households within the same village; farmers cultivating rice
in the lowlands and shrimp farmers were the most severely and persistently affected, while
vegetable farmers in the highlands and even lowland farmers cultivating jute could relatively
mitigate the cyclone damage. Construction workers rather benefited from increases in
demand for house repairing. These situations provided opportunities among villagers to share
risks.
The household survey was conducted in the district in December 2010, 19 months
after the cyclone. I employed a multistage stratified random sampling methodology. In the
first stage, I selected the three sub-districts (upazila) of Samnagar, Kaliganj, and Ashashoni,
based on their economic status and the intensity of the cyclone damage. In the second stage, I
randomly sampled two unions from each sub-district.4 In the next stage, four villages from
each union and one cluster (para) from each of the villages were randomly selected. Finally, I
selected 18 households from each para.5 Since five households were unavailable for the
survey, I obtained a total of 427 of 432 sample households from 24 para.
Key variables in the survey data are the income correlation and the gap in the income
volatilities between trustor and trustee. In order to elicit them, retrospective information was
collected on household income and experience of weather shocks for eight periods over the
period January 2007–December 2010—namely, the dry and rainy seasons of each year. The
household income includes income from self-employed (farm and non-farm), employed
(farm and non-farm), and rent income, and income from each component is elicited by asking
4 The union is an administrative unit in Bangladesh; each union contains multiple villages.
5 In the survey area, the average para size is 72.5 households.
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the net value. De Mel et al. (2009) have shown that computing income from this direct
method provides a more accurate measure than detailed questions on revenues and expenses.
To check the validity of this method, I compare the income computed from the detailed
information such as the harvest volume of crops, wholesale prices, and input costs. Although
this information is available only for the recent four periods, they do not significantly differ
(p-value=0.411, N=1116). The weather shock variables are self-reported binary variables that
take unity if the household experienced shocks—such as drought or inundation—and zero
otherwise. From this retrospective information, I compiled a pseudo-panel dataset. Therefore,
eight-period panel data were available to compute variations in and correlations of household
income. Since these data are retrospective and self-reported, they may suffer from
measurement error; this point is taken up in Section 4.2.
In this survey, the interviewers asked about current relationships with each of the
other 17 survey households in the same para. The collected information included the
distances between their residences and whether they attend the same mosque, temple, or
church. In cases where the respondents did not know the opponents, they could not answer
these questions, and so the dataset includes some missing values.
Summary statistics are presented in Appendix A1 of Online Appendix. It appears that
32% of the sample households experienced inundation of their residence during Cyclone Aila,
and 19% of the survey households borrowed from neighbours, friends, or relatives after the
cyclone, implying that risk sharing among villagers plays the role of insurance.6 In addition
to the cyclone attack, negative income shocks such as inundation and drought occur with a
probability of around 10–20% during the survey period.
6 Admittedly, the sources of informal loans may include relatives in other villages. However,
it is common in Bangladesh that relatives reside in the same village and form a small
community, bari. The bari plays a role of a risk sharing network (Park, 2006). Thus, this
study presumes that the informal loans were transacted mainly within the village.
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3.2. Experiment
Eight months after the household survey, the heads of the survey households in Kaliganj and
Ashashoni were invited to partake in an economic experiment that used real money.7 In cases
where the household head was not available, the next senior person representing the
household (usually the spouse) was recruited to maintain the sample size. Ultimately, 279 of
the 285 households participated in the experiment. The experiment was implemented at the
local government office, and each day I conducted the experiment with 36 participants
invited from two villages. All 36 participants were first gathered in a room, and they were
then randomly allocated to two rooms. Each participant played the take-away game, dictator
game, trust game with hidden action, risk preference game, and trust game; however, this
study uses the results only from the dictator, risk preference, and trust games. The
experimenters were hired in Bangladesh, and since participants had an average of fewer than
six years of schooling (Table A1), the experimenters explained the experimental design
slowly and carefully. More details about the experimental procedure and instruction and the
result of these games are reported in the Online Appendix.
After finishing all the games, each participant rolled two coloured dice. Each colour
represented a decision made during the games, and he/she received his/her payoff from only
one randomly selected decision.8 Therefore, the participants did not know from which
decision they received the payoff and were aware that each participant had earned money
from a different decision. This payment process was explained to the participants prior to
starting the first game. This process is important for two reasons. First, it alleviates the
correlation of choices within participants across games due to the wealth effect. Second, if
participants had been able to earn money from all games and discuss the payoffs after the
7 The experiment in Samnagar was cancelled due to flooding.
8 Besides the payoff from the games, I also provided BDT100 as a participation fee. This is
the same amount as the median daily wage, as per the survey data.
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experiment, they might have been able to infer the choices of the other participants. This
would have violated participant anonymity and potentially affected their behaviour.
3.2.1. Trust Game
This study used the trust game of Berg et al. (1995) to elicit particularized trust. This game is
played by a randomly matched pair of participants. These participants are randomly assigned
roles—namely, a first mover (trustor) and a second mover (trustee). When the game starts, the
experimenter provides the first mover with an endowment of 300 Bangladeshi taka (BDT)
and the second mover with nothing. This amount is equivalent to about three days’ worth of
income in the study area. In the first stage of this game, the first mover decides how much of
the BDT300 to send to the second mover and how much to keep. He or she can send BDT300,
250, 200, 150, 100, 50, or none. The amount sent is tripled by the experimenter before it
reaches the second mover. In the second stage, the second mover can return some of the
received amount to the first mover. Thus, the material payoff for the first and second movers
is 300 − ݐ+ ݎ and 3ݐ− ݎ, respectively, where ݐ and ݎ denote the amount to be sent to
the second mover and the amount to be returned to the first mover, respectively. The
maximum amount of payoff from this game is BDT900 (to the second mover, when t = 300
and r = 0). In the study area, this is equivalent to nine days’ worth of income.
A feature differentiating my experimental design from that of Berg et al. (1995) is
that it is conducted under both anonymous and non-anonymous conditions, in order to elicit
generalized and particularized trust, respectively.9 The first mover first decides how much to
send, without knowing to whom he or she is sending the money.10 After this, the participants
9 Although the strategy method has some potential concerns, Brandts and Charness (2011)
show that, based on the results of a large number of previous studies, the results of the
strategy and direct-response methods are comparable.
10 Strictly speaking, this approach may not capture generalized trust precisely, if the
participants were aware that half of the participants were from the same village.
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make decisions under a non-anonymous condition: I randomly divided the 18 participants
from the same para into two groups (nine in each group), and the experimenter shows each
participant the name list of the other eight participants in the same group to ask how much to
send, if this game were played with each of them. Thus, eight dyadic observations were
collected from each participant.
After all participants have made decisions in the role of first mover, they make
decisions as the second mover. Again, they are asked how much to return under both
anonymous and non-anonymous conditions; the experimenter initially informs each second
mover how much he or she actually received from the paired first mover, but does not inform
from whom he or she received it. After deciding how much to return under the anonymous
condition, they are again shown the name list of the eight participants, and the participants
decide the amount to return to each of them.11
In this game, the second mover has no extrinsic incentive to return money at the
second stage. Expecting this, it is rational for the first mover to keep all the money. In other
words, calculative trust does not exist for first movers. However, those who still expect
trustworthy behaviour from the second mover and/or those who are willing to trust him or her
will send money. Therefore, the fraction the first mover sends to the second mover, ݐ/3,
captures trust, and the fraction that the second mover returns to the first mover, 100ݎ/3ݐ,
indicates trustworthiness.
3.2.2. Risk Preference Game
Risk preference is elicited based on the methodology of Schechter (2007b). This game is
similar to that involving the first mover of the trust game, but it is played alone. When the
11 The pair was determined prior to the game, and therefore, the endowment was transferred
between the real pair. However, the participants were not informed about the name of the real
pair, but only the names of eight potential opponents.
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game starts, the experimenter provides an endowment of BDT300 and a die. Participants
decide how much to bet on the die. They can bet BDT300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 50, or none.
After the participant decides how much to bet, he or she rolls the die. The payoff in this game
depends on how much he or she bets on the die and the result of the bet, as follows:300 + ݖ(ܱ݀݀ݏ− 1). Here, ݖ denotes the amount participant i bets on the die, and ܱ݀݀ݏ
takes 0 if the die lands on 1, 0.5 if the die lands on 2, 1 if the die lands on 3, 1.5 if the die
lands on 4, 2 if the die lands on 5, and 2.5 if the die lands on 6. The level of risk aversion is
measured by the proportion of endowment to be bet on the die, given that more risk-averse
individuals are expected to bet lower amounts.
3.2.3. Dictator Game
This study uses the dictator game to elicit the pure altruism of participants. The experimental
design follows that of Forsythe et al. (1994). This game is played anonymously by a
randomly matched pair of participants, referred to as the dictator and recipient. When the
game starts, the experimenters provide an endowment of BDT400 to the dictator and nothing
to the recipient. The dictator can then allocate BDT400, 350, 300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 50, or
none to the recipient. The extent of pure altruism is measured by the proportion of
endowment allocated to his or her recipient.12 This study elicits this preference parameter
from all participants by using the strategy method across the roles in the game.
4. Identification Strategy
4.1.Estimation Model
This study elicits the level of individual i’s particularized trust by employing the proportion
of endowment transferred from i to j in the non-anonymous trust game. Although previous
12 Since this game was conducted after a take-away game, the rule was explained in this
context. See Slide “Take Away (1)-4” in the Online Appendix for details.
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studies employ i’s expectation about the amount j will return (Barr, 2003), this cannot capture
the trusting preference or the accuracy of trusting belief, which are also important
components of trust. A potential drawback of my measure, however, is that the amount of
transfer can be attributed to other motives than particularized trust, such as generalized and
particularized altruism, reputation building, risk preference, and generalized trust. However,
as I will argue in Section 5, these factors cannot fully explain the observed patterns of
transfer.
The hypotheses are tested by regressing individual i’s particularized trust in j on their
income correlation, absolute value differences in their risk preferences and their income
volatilities, as well as summations of their risk preferences and their income volatilities.
Specifically, this section estimates the following dyadic regression model:
ܶݎݑݏݐ௩௜௝ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܥ݋ݎݎ௩௜௝+ ߚଶหܤ ݁ݐ௩௜− ܤ ݁ݐ௩௝ห+ ߚଷ൫ܤ ݁ݐ௩௜+ ܤ ݁ݐ௩௝൯+ ߚସหܵ ܦ௩௜− ܵܦ௩௝ห+ ߚହ൫ܵ ܦ௩௜+ ܵܦ௩௝൯+ ܲݎ݋ݔ௩௜௝ߚ଺ + ܺ௩௝ߚ଻ + ܦ௩௜+ ߝ௩௜௝
(1)
where ܶݎݑݏݐ௩௜௝ represents the proportion of endowment transferred from participant i
(trustor) to j (trustee) in Para v; ܥ݋ݎݎ௩௜௝ denotes the correlation coefficient of incomes
between households i and j; ܵܦ௩୧ denotes the standard deviation of household i’s income;13
and ܤ ݁ݐ௩௜ represents i’s willingness to take risks, as quantified by the proportion of
endowment bet in the risk preference game. The hypothesis predicts that ߚଵ < 0, ߚଶ > 0,
andߚସ > 0 . ܲݎ݋ݔ௩௜௝ includes social proximity variables such as geographic distance
between their houses; two dummy variables representing the relationship between i and j,
such as relative and stranger (the reference group is friend/acquaintance); and three dummy
13 One may suggest the use of coefficient of variation rather than the standard deviation,
given that the latter is positively correlated with the income level. However, it is
inappropriate to use it, since the household income can take a negative value, particularly
during disasters. Therefore, this study isolates the effect of average income by controlling for
the holdings of productive assets.
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variables indicating whether the gender of the participants, the place of worship and
occupations of the households are the same, respectively.14 ܺ௩௝ is j’s characteristics, such as
the proportion of endowment allocated in the dictator game (pure altruism), proportion
returned in the trust game under the anonymous condition (generalized trustworthiness),
socio-economic status, and demographics.15 Finally, ܦ௩௜ denotes the trustor (household)
fixed effects, capturing the trustor’s income volatility, generalized trust, risk preference, and
socio-economic characteristics.
Given the dyadic structure of the model, the residuals could be correlated over i and
over j. An approach to adjust the correlation of residuals is the use of dyadic standard errors
proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007). However, since the residuals may be correlated
across households within para as well, I use the clustered standard errors at para level.
4.2. Endogeneity of Income Dynamics
An issue in the estimation of Equation (1) is endogeneity of income correlation (Corrvij) and
volatility (SDvi). Social capital plays a significant role in the income-earning behaviour in
developing countries (Fafchamps, 2004), and therefore, trust might also affect income
correlation and volatility. In order to address this issue, I employ the method of Albarran and
Attanasio (2003), which isolates the unanticipated component from the total income by
estimating the following equation:
݊ܫ ݋ܿ݉ ௩݁୧௧ = ∑ ߛ௞ ℎܵ݋ܿ ௩݇୧௧௞ହ௞ୀଵ + ܦ௩୧+ ௩߳୧௧ݐ= 1,2, … 8, (2)
14 As explained in Section 3, the dyadic data—such as the distance between residences and
whether they go to the same mosque/temple/church—are unobserved when individual i
considers j as a stranger. In these cases, the missing data are replaced with 0, and a dummy
variable for stranger is added to the independent variables (Greene, 2011). Thus, the dummy
for stranger captures both the social proximity effect and the effect of missing values in the
dyadic characteristics.
15 In line with Schechter (2007a), participant j’s generalized trustworthiness is assumed to be
exogenous for i.
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where ݊ܫ ݋ܿ݉ ௩݁୧௧ denotes household i’s seasonal income per month at period t; ℎܵ݋ܿ ௩݇୧௧௞
takes unity if household i experiences exogenous income shock k at period t, and 0 otherwise;
and ܦ௩୧ represents household fixed effects that control for the anticipated component of
income. The shock variables include inundation due to cyclones and floods; soil salinization
caused by tidal waves; drought; pests, weeds, and animals; and the loss of productive assets.
These weather shocks affect agricultural and non-agricultural labour income significantly,
and the probability of being affected by the shocks is uncontrollable and unpredictable for
households, after controlling for the household fixed effects that capture the geographic
characteristics and time-invariant socio-economic characteristics. Therefore, I define the
income explained by these shock variables, ∑ ߛො௞ ℎܵ݋ܿ ௩݇୧௧௞ହ௞ୀଵ , as unanticipated income.
Finally, I use the unanticipated income to compute the exogenous standard deviation and
correlation coefficient. The estimation result of Equation (2) is reported in Table A2. As
expected, the inundation of fields significantly affected household income.
The use of weather shocks for the instrument, however, has the following issues that
need to be addressed. First, the characteristics of households vulnerable to the weather shocks
may be systematically different from those that are not. For example, they work on the
riverbank. They are also less concerned about risk management, and therefore do not invest
in pump tube-wells or pesticides. However, the occupation and location of the working place
are time-invariant, and the ownership of tube-well and input cost for farming do not change
across seasons in the dataset.16 Thus, the heterogeneity across households should be captured
by the household fixed effects. After controlling for the fixed effects, the timing of shock
should depend on exogenous factors, such as the precipitation in each season and the path of
tropical cyclones.
16 The statistics are not reported in the paper but are available from the author upon request.
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Second, a positive correlation in the experience of shocks between two households
may capture their geographic and socio-economic proximity and, therefore, in-group
favouritism. This has a direct positive effect on particularized trust (Etang et al., 2011).
Although this study controls for various dyadic characteristics in Equation (1), the potential
of unobserved characteristics leads to the violation of exclusion restriction. However, as long
as the estimated impact of income correlation on particularized trust is negative, this issue
should not affect the interpretation of results. Further, I test the robustness to unobserved
dyadic characteristics, by using the method of Bellows and Miguel (2009). This quantifies
how influential the unobserved characteristics should be to fully explain the estimated effect.
As shown in the Online Appendix A3, the results are robust to the issue.
The third issue pertains to reverse causality; an increase in one’s trust in a particular
neighbour might influence his/her income-earning behaviour and therefore the probability of
being affected by the weather shocks. However, given that the average household can call for
help to as many as 11.9 neighbours (Table A1), it is unlikely that the development of trust in a
neighbour can be that influential. Nevertheless, for those with a small risk sharing network,
this might be possible. Therefore, as a robustness check, in the Online Appendix A3 this
study estimates Equation (1) excluding the households that can call for help to fewer than
five neighbours.
Fourth, given that the shock variables are self-reported, some households may
over-report their hardships more than others, even though their actual damages are
comparable, violating the exclusion restriction of the instrument. However, if one’s tendency
to over-report is time-invariant, the household fixed effects in Equation (2) should be able to
mitigate this problem. This assumption is likely to hold, since the data on the shock variables
were surveyed only once in December 2010. Therefore, the criteria for reporting the shocks
could be the same across the eight periods. Nevertheless, one might still be concerned that the
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recall bias causes the measurement error in the shocks of the earlier period to be more serious,
particularly if the household head is older. Therefore, in the Online Appendix A3, this study
estimates the model that excludes households where the head is aged over 60.
Fifth, the correlation of unanticipated income may affect particularized trust through
channels other than the incentive for risk sharing. For example, the dyads that were affected
by negative shocks at the same time may feel emotional sympathy, and this facilitates
particularized trust even without sharing their risks. However, again, it cannot explain the
negative impact of income correlation on trust.
Sixth, Table A2 in the Online Appendix shows that the instruments are weak: F-value
for the joint significance of the instruments is 4.45. This is presumably because the
instruments are self-reported and binary variables, and hence cannot measure the severity of
shocks. This measurement error causes attenuation bias in the first-stage result. Therefore, the
coefficients of Corrvij, หܵ ܦ௩௜− ܵܦ௩௝ห, and ܵܦ௩௜+ ܵܦ௩௝ in the second stage should be biased
to the direction of OLS estimates, and the standard errors become larger. This issue is
discussed in Section 5 by comparing the results of OLS and IV.
Finally, this approach makes the correlation coefficient unidentified for 39% of the
dyads; 64 households reported no shocks during the survey periods, causing the variation in
unanticipated income to be zero. Therefore, in line with Greene (2011), I replace the
correlation coefficient with zero for such dyads and run the regressions with an additional
independent variable that takes unity if the correlation is unidentifiable and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, since these 64 households may not have answered the household survey
seriously, as a robustness check this study also estimates the model without these households
in the Online Appendix A3.
4.3. Incentive and Risk-Sharing Behaviour
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Thus far, this study assumes that the incentive for risk sharing facilitates risk sharing
behaviour, such as informal loan transactions among villagers. Before showing the main
result of particularized trust formation, this section tests the validity of this assumption. It is
straightforward to investigate the impact of incentive to share risks between a dyad on their
transactions. However, such information is unfortunately unavailable in this dataset, and
therefore this study provides suggestive evidence by examining the consumption and
borrowing behaviour at the household level. Specifically, it tests whether the cyclone-affected
households in the community with higher incentive to share risk can borrow more from
informal sources than those in the community with lower incentive.
The following borrowing equation is estimated:
ܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ௩௜= ∆݊ܫ ݋ܿ݉ ௩݁௜ቀߚଵ + ܥ݋ݎݎ௩పതതതതതതതതߚଶ + หܤ ݁ݐ௩ప− ܤ ݁ݐ௩ఫหതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതߚଷ + ൫ܤ ݁ݐ௩ప+ ܤ ݁ݐ௩ఫ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതߚସ+ หܵ ܦ௩ప− ܵܦ௩ఫหതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതߚହ + ൫ܵ ܦ௩ప+ ܵܦ௩ఫ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതߚ଺ቁ+ ܲݎ݋ݔ௩పതതതതതതതതതߚ଻ + ܺ௩௜଼ߚ + ௩ܸ + ߝ௩௜
(3)
where ܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ௩௜ is the amount of informal loans which household i in Para v borrowed
from his or her relatives, neighbours, and friends within 12 months after the cyclone in 2009.
∆݊ܫ ݋ܿ݉ ௩݁௜ is the first difference of monthly income between the agricultural season before
the cyclone and the season after.17 This variable is instrumented by the specification
employed in Equation (2). ܥ݋ݎݎ௩పതതതതതതതത is the mean of ܥ݋ݎݎ௩௜௝ over j. The other variables are
defined in the same manner. Finally, ௩ܸ indicates the Para fixed effects. The argument in
Section 2.1 suggests that disaster-affected household i should be able to borrow more from
the community members if i’s income is negatively correlated with their incomes, and i’s risk
preference and income volatility are different from theirs. Therefore, it is expected that
17 The dependent variable does not take the first difference, given that the informal loans
were rarely observed in the period before the cyclone.
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ߚଶ > 0, ߚଷ < 0, and ߚହ < 0.
The estimation result from a Tobit model is reported in Table 1. Column 1 presents
that the households in the average community borrow from informal sources in the face of
negative income shocks. Particularly, the association between them is larger when i’s
household income is negatively correlated with the neighbours’ income (Columns 2 & 5). It
is also shown that i can borrow more if his/her risk preference and income volatility differ
from those of the neighbours (Columns 3, 4, & 5). These results support the validity of
underlying assumption.
[Table 1]
5. Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results of Equation (1). Columns 1 to 7 present the
determinants of i’s particularized trust in j. The table shows strong support for the main
hypothesis, Hypothesis (a); particularized trust is high if incomes are negatively correlated
between the trustor and trustee. This is robust across columns and robust to the issue of weak
instrument; first, the signs of these coefficients are the same in the OLS and IV estimations,
and the absolute values of IV coefficients are larger. Second, the standard errors in the IV
estimates are larger, but the coefficients are still statistically significant. Further, this finding
is also robust to the possibilities of various specification errors, such as reverse causality,
measurement errors, omitted variable bias, and computation method of standard errors
(Online Appendix A3).
Regarding Hypotheses (b) and (c), they do not fit the data as much as Hypothesis (a),
as expected. The coefficients of the difference in risk preferences demonstrate expected signs
for all the columns, but they are statistically insignificant. The difference in income
volatilities presents insignificant and negative association with particularized trust, counter to
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the hypothesis.
Two points should be emphasized, however, regarding the poor explanatory power
of risk preference and income volatility. First, negative income correlation as well as large
gaps in the risk preferences and income volatilities in the dyad may capture mixed effects on
trust. On the one hand, they increase the incentive for risk sharing and facilitate trust, but on
the other hand, they weaken the in-group favouritism between individuals. Hence, fully
controlling for the latter effect should strengthen the estimation results. In fact, I examine the
potential roles of unobserved dyadic characteristics in the Online Appendix A3, and observe a
consistent result. Therefore, the current result should be considered a lower bound of actual
causal effect. Second, the explanatory power of negative assortative matching in the risk
preference and income volatility relies on the sharing rules as argued in Section 2.1. Hence, it
may not be surprising even if Hypotheses (b) and (c) present weaker explanatory power than
(a).
It is also important that the dependent variable might be affected by motives other
than particularized trust. First, the proportion of transfer is attributed to the trustor’s
generalized trust, risk preference, generalized pure/impure altruism, and fairness (Ashraf et
al., 2006; Cox, 2004; Ligon and Schechter, 2012; Schechter, 2007b). In addition, given that
the participants made decisions in front of the experimenter, concerns about their social
image in the eyes of the experimenters could have potentially affected their behaviour.
However, presuming that the impact of these factors does not vary across the eight trustees,
the trustor fixed effects, Di, can capture these effects.
Second, the incentive for risk sharing might increase the transfer through the
development of particularized altruism to j rather than trust to j. Admittedly, it is not easy to
rule out this possibility, given the unavailability of data on particularized altruism. Therefore,
it might be appropriate to interpret the empirical result as evidence on the formation of social
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capital/preference rather than trust formation. However, the table suggests that particularized
altruism cannot fully explain the patterns of transfer. If particularized altruism drives the
larger amount of transfer, the trustors should transfer more endowment to the poor and
cyclone-affected individuals, who can yield a larger utility gain from the transfer. Therefore,
we should observe the negative coefficients of the trustee’s asset holdings and education, and
the positive coefficient of cyclone damage. However, such results are not observed.
Finally, if the participants do not perceive the behaviour in the experiment to be fully
anonymous, they may transfer more to the opponents who they will ask for help in the future
(i.e., those with high incentive to share risks), so that they can build reputation. However, if
this is the case, they should transfer more to the opponents who they got to know recently too,
because the marginal effect of transfer on building reputation is expected to be larger. The
table, however, shows the opposite effect.
Regarding the other independent variables, most social proximity variables—such as
kinship, gender, occupation, and religion—are insignificant. The coefficient of dummy for
stranger is positive because it captures the influence of unmeasured dyadic characteristics as
mentioned in Footnote 14. In addition, the trustor does not necessarily trust a trustworthy
and/or altruistic trustee; this finding is consistent with those of Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)
and Binzel and Fehr (2013), while it is inconsistent with that of Falk and Zehnder (2013). The
result does not change qualitatively when controlling for particularized rather than
generalized trustworthiness.18 This may be because the main motive for the transfer to j is
high willingness to adopt trusting behaviour rather than high expected trustworthiness.
In addition to the main estimation model of particularized trust, Columns 8 to 14 of
the table examine j’s particularized trustworthiness to i for robustness, which is measured by
the proportion of received amount returned to i. In this model, I control for the amount i sent
18 The estimation result is not reported in this paper, but is available from the author upon
request.
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to j, instead of j’s generalized trustworthiness. Intriguingly, it shows that j’s particularized
trustworthiness is significantly higher if the gap in their risk preferences is larger. This is in
line with Hypothesis (b). Income correlation in the dyad also demonstrates negative
coefficients in three of four columns, and two are statistically significant. Finally, the
difference in income volatilities is positively associated with particularized trustworthiness,
as expected, while the coefficients are statistically insignificant.
6. Conclusions
This study shows that the incentive to share risk facilitates particularized trust formation
among villagers in rural Bangladesh. It also provides suggestive evidence that the higher trust
is caused by the increased opportunities of cooperation.
Some possible policy implications may be derived, given that the provision of
incentive for cooperation is found to facilitate social capital. Improvements to formal
institutions so as to help villagers smooth consumption for idiosyncratic shocks can diminish
trust among villagers, since it makes them less dependent on informal risk sharing. This in
turn offsets returns to programs by lowering the efficiency of risk sharing. Such
trust-reducing policies include the introduction of health insurance, an increase in the wages
of unskilled labour, and reductions in the transaction costs of livestock sales. On the other
hand, participation in microfinance might enhance trust, as it strengthens potential
punishments against deviation. In line with this, there is empirical evidence showing the
positive effect of microfinance participation on social capital (Feigenberg et al., 2013).
Furthermore, job training programs that introduce a new industry in the community may also
increase particularized trust, since they cause the income dynamics of villagers to become
less correlated, and increase the net gains derived from risk sharing.
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Table 1: Incentive for Risk Sharing and Informal Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Income -8.958* -25.242*** 21.777 6.203 46.286*
(5.177) (7.709) (13.864) (15.072) (26.127)
∆Income x ܥ݋ݎݎതതതതതത 34.032*** 28.593*
(11.358) (14.700)
1 if ܥ݋ݎݎതതതതതത is unidentified -0.970 -3.246
(7.101) (5.934)
∆Income x หBet௩ప− Bet௩ఫหതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത -0.409 -0.541**
(0.257) (0.265)
∆Income x ൫Bet௩ప+ Bet௩ఫ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത -0.191*** -0.239***
(0.064) (0.075)
∆Income x หSD௩ప− SD௩ఫหതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത -65.620*** -40.536*
(19.327) (23.909)
∆Income x ൫SD௩ప+ SD௩ఫ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 3.761 -19.607
(15.023) (15.663)
Household Characteristics
Generalized trustworthiness 0.069 0.050 0.080 0.047 0.062
(0.089) (0.083) (0.094) (0.085) (0.089)
% allocated in the dictator game -0.016 -0.000 -0.038 0.007 -0.012
(0.054) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048)
Age of participant -0.095 -0.071 -0.093 -0.089 -0.047
(0.169) (0.172) (0.159) (0.180) (0.160)
Schooling years of participant 0.073 0.105 -0.011 0.032 0.059
(0.485) (0.484) (0.438) (0.510) (0.461)
Land holdings -11.873 -11.470 -14.149 -11.942 -13.920
(12.833) (13.149) (14.164) (13.021) (14.368)
Liquid assets 57.637** 45.504* 66.081** 61.103** 66.394**
(24.671) (25.011) (26.334) (25.198) (29.634)
1 if engaging in farming -2.184 -4.107 -1.841 -2.477 -3.451
(3.259) (3.469) (3.658) (3.293) (3.943)
1 if engaging in processing -6.237 -6.862 -5.832 -7.353 -7.272
(6.912) (7.406) (7.146) (6.847) (6.862)
Inundation of residence (Months) -5.905 -5.800 -8.062** -5.775 -8.137**
(4.392) (3.663) (3.804) (4.219) (3.557)
Mean dyadic characteristics at the Para level
Years since knowing -0.087 -0.093 -0.081 -0.092 -0.100
(0.254) (0.240) (0.251) (0.242) (0.224)
1 if relative -17.302 -13.009 -17.479 -10.124 -5.427
(10.936) (10.462) (11.495) (12.956) (13.985)
1 if stranger -155.068*** -140.793** -147.133*** -161.200** -164.539**
(57.902) (54.470) (56.516) (66.738) (74.192)
1 if the participants’ gender are the same -1.589 -3.649 5.099 -3.573 2.664
(7.779) (8.694) (7.105) (8.340) (7.957)
1 if the same occupation category -1.657 -0.708 -5.754 -1.011 -5.175
(8.786) (8.879) (8.971) (8.805) (9.326)
1 if going to the same mosque -16.422** -16.407** -12.087 -17.261** -14.902**
(8.155) (6.906) (7.537) (8.092) (6.848)
Distance between houses (km) -41.188 -42.864* -41.932 -41.638* -46.612*
(26.371) (23.931) (30.173) (24.021) (25.735)
Observations 251 251 251 251 251
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors at the Para level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: The Impact of Incentive on Particularized Trust
i’s trust in j j’s trustworthiness in i
IV OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Dyadic Characteristics
Income correlation -2.318* -2.110** -3.200* -2.372** -0.467 -3.901* 0.090 -4.271**
(1.207) (0.932) (1.559) (0.987) (4.596) (1.939) (5.173) (1.459)
1 if correlation is 0.833 3.314 6.670 0.705
unidentified (1.574) (2.211) (5.784) (6.990)
หBet௩௜− Bet௩௝ห 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.086** 0.077** 0.087**
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)Bet௩௜+ Bet௩௝ -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.063 0.055 0.062
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067)
หSD௩௜− SD௩௝ห -2.610 -0.169 -6.808 -0.143 0.849 0.192 0.796 0.448
(3.767) (0.872) (4.924) (0.855) (6.609) (1.182) (7.012) (1.070)SD௩௜+ SD௩௝ 1.740 0.002 6.347* -0.073 -22.188** -0.413 -19.757 -0.726
(3.096) (0.759) (3.441) (0.754) (8.848) (1.694) (11.894) (1.609)
Years since knowing 0.335*** 0.332*** 0.330*** 0.326*** 0.332*** 0.333*** 0.336*** -0.130 -0.151 -0.156 -0.133 -0.151 -0.134 -0.146
(0.073) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.070) (0.074) (0.109) (0.104) (0.107) (0.114) (0.097) (0.116) (0.096)
1 if relative 0.080 -0.120 -0.044 -0.050 -0.109 0.297 -0.147 0.644 0.231 0.455 0.345 0.301 0.476 0.306
(2.780) (2.799) (2.772) (2.781) (2.768) (2.772) (2.762) (3.641) (3.513) (3.593) (3.650) (3.544) (3.757) (3.560)
1 if stranger 5.381* 5.287* 5.391* 5.462* 5.413* 5.493* 5.223* -12.509* -13.239** -13.949** -12.253* -13.048* -13.146** -14.391**
(2.563) (2.563) (2.599) (2.602) (2.541) (2.603) (2.491) (6.132) (6.063) (5.942) (6.119) (6.235) (5.911) (5.978)
1 if the participants’ 0.935 0.807 0.932 0.928 0.962 0.916 0.824 2.923* 2.871 3.353* 2.493 3.161* 2.760 3.182*
gender are the same (1.251) (1.268) (1.292) (1.255) (1.244) (1.291) (1.297) (1.647) (1.650) (1.723) (1.530) (1.616) (1.630) (1.749)
1 if the same 0.006 0.249 -0.007 -0.057 -0.016 0.088 0.273 -4.260 -4.547 -4.570 -4.323 -5.036 -3.915 -4.062
occupation category (1.523) (1.503) (1.577) (1.577) (1.545) (1.532) (1.525) (3.568) (3.270) (3.165) (3.145) (3.233) (3.323) (3.204)
1 if going to the same -1.195 -1.288 -1.163 -1.100 -1.172 -1.026 -1.300 -0.991 -1.177 -0.897 -1.135 -0.964 -1.091 -1.225
mosque (2.779) (2.694) (2.707) (2.732) (2.704) (2.801) (2.644) (4.946) (4.799) (4.669) (4.941) (4.835) (4.806) (4.683)
Distance between 1.946 2.244 2.348 2.528 2.398 1.901 2.144 -7.631 -7.489 -7.847 -6.924 -7.276 -7.533 -8.242
houses (km) (5.344) (5.300) (5.297) (5.413) (5.372) (5.449) (5.315) (7.220) (7.134) (6.816) (7.099) (7.328) (6.635) (6.835)
Trustee
Characteristics
Generalized -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.017
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trustworthiness (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Amount sent by i -0.034 -0.031 -0.036 -0.037 -0.032 -0.039 -0.033
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027)
% allocated in the -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.013 -0.014 -0.011 0.280*** 0.274*** 0.277*** 0.280*** 0.276*** 0.282*** 0.279***
dictator game (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060) (0.065) (0.059) (0.063)
Age of participant -0.040 -0.049 -0.041 -0.041 -0.043 -0.043 -0.053 -0.050 -0.064 -0.035 -0.040 -0.053 -0.029 -0.056
(0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.102) (0.109) (0.101) (0.101) (0.096) (0.101) (0.100)
Schooling years of -0.074 -0.098 -0.084 -0.087 -0.094 -0.068 -0.107 0.874 0.837 0.895* 0.888* 0.861 0.917* 0.878*
participant (0.095) (0.108) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098) (0.093) (0.106) (0.503) (0.487) (0.470) (0.488) (0.493) (0.477) (0.474)
Land holdings 0.015 -0.187 -0.212 -0.237 -0.028 0.132 0.090 1.195 0.791 -0.511 0.826 1.117 -0.244 0.086
(1.282) (1.263) (1.367) (1.255) (1.394) (1.308) (1.516) (4.848) (4.914) (4.944) (4.842) (5.442) (4.839) (5.712)
Liquid assets -0.066 0.528 -0.121 -0.658 -0.177 -0.928 0.735 -4.984 -7.237 -3.074 3.103 -8.099 6.849 -1.402
(10.687) (10.558) (11.081) (10.223) (10.019) (10.794) (10.433) (32.877) (35.272) (36.416) (30.138) (33.914) (31.611) (34.551)
1 if engaging in 1.365 1.085 1.345 1.260 1.418 0.978 1.115 4.816 4.260 4.635 6.472 4.892 6.188 4.307
farming (1.624) (1.648) (1.625) (1.618) (1.654) (1.545) (1.627) (3.476) (3.346) (3.465) (3.743) (3.514) (3.797) (3.351)
1 if engaging in 3.401** 2.819* 3.163** 3.148** 3.436** 3.484** 3.088** 4.483 3.193 3.057 4.058 4.361 3.354 2.941
processing (1.379) (1.469) (1.352) (1.413) (1.310) (1.309) (1.324) (4.577) (4.343) (4.196) (4.489) (4.797) (4.334) (4.420)
Inundation of -0.185 -0.299 -0.305 -0.407 -0.293 -0.344 -0.294 3.401 2.892 3.072 3.942 2.944 4.035 3.158
residence (Months) (0.795) (0.840) (0.817) (0.826) (0.835) (0.801) (0.838) (3.801) (3.675) (3.522) (3.652) (3.710) (3.603) (3.627)
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920
Number of trustors 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
Trustor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors at the Para level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
